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CHAPTER 14

Embedded Versus Behindthe-Lines Reporting on the
2003 Iraq War
Stephen D. Cooper and Jim A. Kuypers

A

2003 study by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
found that “Most Americans (53%) believe that news organizations are politically
biased, while just 29% say they are careful to remove bias from their reports ...
More than half— 51%— say that the bias is ‘liberal,’ while 26% discerned a
‘conservative’ leaning. Fourteen percent felt neither phrase applied” (Harper,
2003). Now add to this that even some academicians are finally accepting the idea
that journalists, as a group, are more liberal than the population as a whole.
However, whether political or other biases (Hahn, 1998) affect news coverage is
still argued. We believe political biases do affect news coverage, in that reporters
and editors select and frame news stories in a way that reflects their
predispositions.
Regarding story selection, Bernard C. Cohen astutely observed the press
“may not be very successful in telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly
successful in telling its readers what to think about” (1963, p.13). Maxwell E.
McCombs and Donald L. Shaw found that voters learn about an issue in direct
proportion to the attention given that issue by the press, and that voters tend to
share what the media defines as important (1972, p. 177). This media effect is
called agenda-setting. Subsequent studies of agenda-setting confirmed that the
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media can have enormous influence upon political decision making and that they
are especially influential in telling the general population what to think about. In
short, there is a correlation between the amount of news coverage of an issue and
that issue’s level of importance to the public.
Further, we find that the news media also suggest how to think about those
issues. Jim A. Kuypers called this agenda-extension (1997), and it occurs when
the media move beyond a neutral reporting of events. One way of locating
instances of media bias— in the sense of non-neutral transmission of
information— is by studying frames, which is one way the media provides its
audiences with contextual cues necessary to evaluate the issues under
consideration.
W illiam Gamson asserted that a “frame is a central organizing idea for
making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (1989, p. 157).
Facts remain neutral until framed; thus, how the press frames an issue or event
will affect public understanding of that issue or event. O n this point Gamson
argued that facts “take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story
line that organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to
emphasize while ignoring others” (p. 157). Framing thus elevates the salience of
some ideas over others, while making some ideas virtually invisible to an
audience.
Although it can be reasonably argued that providing contextual cues for
interpretation of events is a part of media responsibility, when journalists infuse
their political preferences into news stories the potential for manipulation
increases. A powerful feature of frames is that they define problems, causes and
solutions, although not necessarily in that order. They also provide the author’s
moral judgments concerning these problems, causes and solutions.
The power of frames to influence the way in which the public interprets
certain issues was demonstrated by Paul M. Sniderman and colleagues. In one
example, which involved the issue of mandatory HIV testing, researchers found
that frames highlight some values over others, thus increasing or decreasing the
saliency of these values: “[A] majority of the public supports the rights of persons
with AIDS when the issue is framed to accentuate civil liberties
considerations— and supports ... mandatory testing when the issue is framed to
accentuate public health considerations” (1991, p. 52). W hen one considers the
pervasiveness of the mass media in America, one must conclude that the potential
power of framing is great indeed.
C OM PAR ATIVE F R A M IN G A N A LYSIS : O NE W A R , T W O F RA M ES
Among the easiest ways to identify frames is through the use of comparative
framing analysis (Kuypers, 1997, 2002; Entmann, 1991, 1993). To that end, this
study looked for differences in war reporting between journalists embedded with
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combat units and journalists based behind the lines. The stories analyzed came
from the New York Times and the Washington Post.
Choosing articles from these two papers created both a strength and
weakness in the analysis. The strength was that both of these papers are still
(recent NYT scandals aside) considered national papers of record. Both have
extensive resources to support continuous coverage of any topic, so differences
in framing observed in this study were unlikely to stem from limited staff or
limited resources. The weakness was that the study analyzed news products of a
limited number of journalists. Although unlikely, it is conceivable that differences
in framing between the stories of embedded journalists and those of behind-thelines journalists observed in this study were unrepresentative of news outlets in
general, but instead, was an artifact of these two particular newspapers.
To the extent possible, stories by embedded reporters and behind-the-lines
reporters were matched by date of publication. This was done to reduce the
possibility that any framing differences observed were attributable to changes over
time of actual conditions in the combat, rather than a property of the journalistic
environment. As a practical matter, one day’s difference in date was still
considered a match. In all, 66 stories published between March 21 and April 10,
2003, were examined. Twenty-six were from embedded reporters and 40 were
from behind-the-lines reporters. This study centered on two major themes in the
war coverage: the strength of Iraqi army resistance and the response of Iraqi
civilians to the Allied incursion. Space limitations in this volume prevent full
discussion of the stories; the following two sections are intended to illustrate the
framing differences as concisely as possible, and should not be taken as a
complete exploration of the data.
I R A Q I M ILITAR Y R ESISTA N CE
Stories written by embedded reporters often reported Iraqi soldiers
surrendering, Iraqi positions destroyed by artillery and aircraft attacks, Iraqi
soldiers deserting and abandoning their uniforms and equipment, the superior
force of the Allied units, and Allied officers surprised by the lack of Iraqi
resistance. Behind-the-lines journalists wrote about Allied casualties and
equipment losses, the potential for unconventional attacks by the Iraqi military,
the ferocity of paramilitary or irregular Iraqi forces, the possibility of urban
combat situations in cities such as Baghdad, and belligerent rhetoric by Iraqi
officials.
The difference in framing became apparent in the early days of the war.
Stories about the commencement of hostilities ran on M arch 21. In the New York
Times, the headline of the story filed by an embedded reporter was, “G.I.’s and
Marines See Little Iraqi Resistance” (Myers, 2003, March 21). Much of this story
described how easily the Allied forces overran the Iraqi border defenses, and
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noted that “the first two border posts turned out to be empty, their soldiers having
fled.” The headline of the story filed from Kuwait was quite different: “16 die on
copter; U.S. and British forces suffer first losses in crash in Kuwait” (Tyler, 2003,
March 21). Two days later, a story by another embedded reporter described many
Iraqi soldiers surrendering, and only limited resistance. This story framed the
combat as “general retreat by the Iraqis with groups of fierce holdouts” (Filkins,
2003, March 23). In contrast, the headline story in that issue (Tyler, 2003, March
23), with a Kuwait dateline, emphasized Allied casualties and loss of vehicles,
mentioned “heavy fighting and mortar exchanges” from the Iraqi forces, and
commented that there was “no outward sign Saturday that either the government
or military command of Mr. Hussein was wavering.”
Directly contradicting the frame of the embedded reporter’s story was the
comment that “the mass surrender that characterized the 1991 Persian Gulf war
had not materialized.” In the next day’s issue a front-page opinion piece (Apple,
2003, March 24), datelined from W ashington, described the Iraqi resistance as
stiffening, and tougher than Allied commanders had expected. An overview article
(Collins, 2003, March 24) referred to the coming “showdown with the Iraqi
Republican Guard,” described the area around Baghdad as “intensely defended,”
and commented that on the prior day “allied forces faced the fiercest fighting of
the war so far and suffered their grimmest casualty toll.”
A week after the war started, a New York Times opinion piece written by a
W ashington-based journalist (Apple, 2003, March 27) framed Iraqi resistance as
well-conceived and effective in its use of terrain features, and the Allied forces as
highly vulnerable to unconventional tactics. Perhaps echoing reporting on the
Vietnam W ar, the piece described the Iraqi war plan as “a kind of guerrilla
defense,” and predicted bloody urban combat in Basra: “the British and the
American marines fighting with them are surely going to become involved in
some kind of street-by-street, if not house-by-house, urban warfare.” Another
opinion piece in the same edition, datelined Kuwait, framed the war as “a tough
fight,” referred in the headline to Allied “setbacks,” and asserted that “the Iraqi
military’s command and control system is still intact” (Gordon, 2003, March 27).
Reports from embedded journalists, however, were noticeably less
pessimistic about the Allies’ chances. In the next day’s edition, one embedded
reporter’s story (Kifner, 2003, March 28) noted that irregular forces were slowing
the advance of U.S. troops, but characterized the resistance as “nearly constant
harassment and ambush by small bands of irregular Iraqi fighters and remnants of
army units” perhaps receiving “rudimentary military direction from Republican
Guard officers.” Another embedded reporter described a surprise attack on
Marine positions around Nasiriya (W ilson, 2003, March 28), which briefly
threatened to overrun the command headquarters. The attack was repulsed, and
the article ended by quoting an American officer saying, “W e had a good day.”
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The contrast between the frames of the behind-the-lines journalists and the
frames of the embedded reporters was, perhaps, even more striking as the serious
fighting for control of Baghdad began. The headline of a hard news story by a
journalist based in Baghdad (Shadid, 2003, April 3) referred to the coming
“climactic defense” of the city. Iraqi officials were described as “defiant,” and
said to “boast that the country’s most vaunted units are primed to repel an assault
for which they have planned for years.” This story continued the frame that the
battle would become “block-by-block guerrilla warfare, with civilians caught in
between.” An analysis by behind-the-lines journalists (Ricks & W eisman, 2003,
April 3) framed the situation as a “dilemma” for the Allied forces, who faced
urban combat against “Hussein’s most loyal fighters, drawn from the Republican
Guard and his bodyguard Special Republican Guard,” who might be planning to
“hol[e] up in the city and wag[e] a grinding war of attrition.” The lead story
(Chandrasekaran & Baker, 2003, April 3), datelined Kuwait City, described
resistance to the Allied advance as “only patchy,” but nonetheless framed the
situation as “the climactic battle— and the most dangerous.”
This was in stark contrast to stories from the embedded reporters of the
Post. One story (Branigin, 2003, April 3) was headlined, “No sign of capital
defenses.” This reporter’s unit encountered “surprisingly little resistance,” and the
Republican Guard units were described as “disintegrating,” with no sign of “the
heavy Iraqi equipment expected to mount the main defense of Baghdad.” Another
story (Finer, 2003, April 3) described a unit moving “more than 70 miles through
Iraq’s central desert in an advance that met little opposition.” These troops took
control of an strategically-important airfield abandoned by a “fleeing Iraqi army.”
The war front moved into Baghdad over the next few days. Stories from
embedded reporters painted a mixed picture of relative quiet punctuated by
firefights, but the stories from behind-the lines journalists—now close to the front
lines!— tended to emphasize the intensity of the fighting. An embedded reporter
described a unit searching for Iraqi troops in a suburb of Baghdad, but finding
only abandoned positions (Finer, 2003, April 6). T he army unit occupying the
airport in Baghdad encountered only “sporadic” resistance (Branigin, 2003, April
6), but another brigade tasked with securing an intersection in the southern part
of the city became involved in “five hours of killing and fiery chaos” (Branigin,
2003, April 7). An embedded reporter detailed a protracted firefight at a river
crossing (Filkins, 2003, April 8), characterizing the Iraqi resistance as “tough, but
uncoordinated.”
Stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists framed the hostilities as being
more intense. One described Baghdad as having become a “war zone,” and
referred to Republican Guard troops and armament having “poured into the
capital,” while irregular forces carrying rocket propelled grenades moved in the
streets (Shadid, 2003, April 6). Another described the gun battles as “fierce” and
the Allied advance as “grinding” (Tyler, 2003, April 7). As Allied forces began
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consolidating their control of the city, Iraqi resistance was still described as
“fierce” (Burns, 2003, April 8; Shadid & Chandrasekaran, 2003, April 8), An
analysis in the New York Times (Apple, 2003, April 9) characterized the resistance
as “stubborn,” and commented that “news of fierce fighting in Hilla ... belies talk
of collapse.”
In fact, Iraqi military resistance did collapse in the next two days. A story
from a reporter embedded in a unit entering Hilla (Atkinson, 2003, April 10)
referred to “shattered resistance” and “brittle defenses.” A story from a reporter
embedded in a unit entering Baghdad described a brief firefight and “mild
resistance from snipers” (Finer, 2003, April 10). Stories filed by behind-the-lines
journalists continued to highlight what resistance there remained, but
acknowledged that the combat was essentially done. One described the extension
of Allied control over the city as “halting,” but noted that by the end of the day
“Iraqi resistance— fought relentlessly but ultimately hopelessly with rockets,
machine guns and other light arms— had died away” (Burns, 2003, April 9).
I R A Q I C IVILIA N R ESPON SE TO

THE

A LLIED F OR CES

Another important theme in the coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom was
the response of Iraqi civilians to the incursion by Allied forces. Early reporting,
both from embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters, dealt mostly with
combat operations, but a distinct theme of civilian response developed after the
first week or so of fighting. This first became an issue related to the adequacy of
the war plans, which anticipated some degree of civilian uprising helping the
Allied operations, and later was often linked to the restoration of civil order in
areas where the Hussein regime’s power structure had been displaced.
In general, the reporting from behind-the-lines journalists featured collateral
damage caused by combat, privations suffered by Iraqi civilians after combat
passed through their areas, and resentment toward occupation troops. In contrast,
reports from embedded journalists described positive interactions between Allied
soldiers and Iraqi civilians, Allied efforts to restore basic utilities to the civilian
population, Iraqi civilians’ fear of reprisals by Ba’ath Party and Saddam Fedayeen
members, and civilians celebrating the collapse of the Hussein regime.
The cautious acceptance of Allied forces was a theme running through three
reports from embedded reporters published in the March 31 New York Times. One
characterized the first interactions between American forces and noncombatant
Iraqis with the word “peacefully” (Filkins, 2003, March 31), and described how
American troops helped an Iraqi civilian get his irrigation pump restarted. Another
story used the word “warily” to describe the first contact between troops and
civilians (Kifner, 2003, M arch 31). The wariness is attributed to memory of the
brutal repression which followed the G ulf W ar, and one civilian is quoted as
saying, “Don’t make the mistake of 1991.” A report filed from the outskirts of
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Basra (Santora & Smith, 2003, March 31,) described civilians caught between
British and Iraqi military units. In this story, fear and uncertainty were the
predominant emotions, which bred mistrust of the Allied forces: noncombatant
residents of Basra were “afraid of Saddam Hussein’s troops inside the city who
they said were executing people freely; afraid of the forces outside the city whose
intentions they did not yet know; and afraid of what would come as their supplies
of food and water continued to dwindle.” A story from a Washington Post
embedded reporter (Branigin, 2003, March 31) described a similar wariness as an
armored column passed villages, prompting residents to raise white flags.
Civilian response to the troops grew warmer in the next few days, at least
in the reports from embedded reporters. Two stories described Iraqis standing by
the road and waving at convoys headed toward Baghdad (Branigin, 2003, April
3; Finer, 2003, April 3). A pair of stories from a journalist embedded with units
entering Najaf (Atkinson, 2003, April 2; Atkinson, 2003, April 3, ) likewise
framed the civilian response as welcoming, even in the turmoil of war. In the first,
civilians were described smiling at American troops, clapping, and “gestur[ing]
impatiently for the Americans to press deeper into the city center.” The next day’s
story framed the welcome as “jubilant,” but noted residents’ concerns that food
and water had become scarce. Another reporter embedded with troops
approaching Baghdad described civilians “cheering and encouraging the troops
as they passed,” framing what he saw as “one of the warmest receptions the
Americans have gotten to date” (Filkins, 2003, April 4). An Iraqi civilian fleeing
Baghdad was quoted as saying, “You have saved us, you have saved us from
him.”
Stories written behind-the-lines, covering the same time period, were
strikingly different in their framing of the civilian response to the Allied incursion.
One story described the burial of a young boy killed in Baghdad (Shadid, 2003,
March 31). W hile the story noted that the boy may well have been killed by
shrapnel from Iraqi antiaircraft fire, it framed the residents of the neighborhood
as angry at the United States for civilian casualties and resentful at the prospect
of an occupation. An analysis in the New York Times struck a distinctly pejorative
tone when it referred to Iraqi civilians “cheer[ing] the invaders of their country”
(Apple, 2003, April 4). The lead story in that same edition (Tyler, 2003, April 4)
framed the civilian response in a similar way: “Allied forces had expected a more
enthusiastic reception.” The lead story in the next day’s edition of the Washington
Post (Chandrasekaran & Baker, 2003, April 5) framed civilians waving to passing
convoys as a “surprise” to the troops. A story datelined from Zubair (Glasser,
2003, April 5), filed after the fighting had moved on to Basra, described civilians’
“ambivalence” about the incursion in this way: “On the streets, children wave and
smile at passing British troops. At the now-empty police station, a banner hangs.
‘Shame on America,’ it says.”
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Another analysis in the New York Times (Apple, 2003, April 6) referred to
“the natural tendency of many Iraqis to feel their patriotic impulses bruised by the
presence of heavily armed invaders in their midst.” This is in stark contrast to the
frame of an embedded reporter’s story (LeDuff, 2003, April 8), about American
troops entering a town of 45,000: “By noon it was apparent that the townspeople
considered [the troops] liberators.” The crowd’s reaction is described as
“euphoria,” and a resident is quoted as saying, “you are owed a favor from the
Iraqis. ... W e are friends.”
W hen the Hussein regime collapsed, the contrast between the framing by
embedded reporters and by behind-the-lines journalists diminished somewhat, but
did not disappear entirely. A story about American troops entering Hilla, written
by the reporter embedded with the unit (Atkinson, 2003, April 10), described the
residents as “jubilant,” and “offering thumbs-up gestures and high-fives to
infantrymen.” The reporter commented that “the subsequent happy pandemonium
had the distinct flavor of liberation.” A story by a reporter embedded with troops
entering Baghdad (Finer, 2003, April 10) described a similar response by
civilians, “who lined the streets as if they were a parade route.” The events were
framed as “the most overt display of welcome the Marines had received since
entering Iraq.”
The two front page stories of the April 10 Washington Post carry headlines
conveyed the celebratory frame, but included a substantial amount of copy
supporting the frame of ambivalence and resentment. Both stories were written by
the same behind-the-lines reporter, who was based in Baghdad throughout the
war. The lead story (Shadid, 2003, April 10a ) framed Baghdad residents as
“celebrat[ing] the government’s defeat and welcom[ing] the U.S. forces in scenes
of thanks and jubiliation.” Most of the description supports that frame, but in the
second half of the article the reporter referred to the “conflicting emotions” of the
moment, and the “hope that the U.S. presence would not become an occupation.”
The other story (Shadid, 2003, April 10b), also appearing above the fold, very
strongly supported the frame of ambivalence. One Baghdad resident is quoted as
saying, “You must bring these words to the American people. Thank you, thank
you very, very much.” Another is quoted as saying, “If they’ve come as
invaders...nobody will welcome them.” The crowd is described as having “erupted
in cheers” at the sight of American military vehicles, and an Iraqi is quoted as
saying, “It is a liberation.” Another is quoted as saying, “This is my country and
this is an occupation.” The reporter summarized these sentiments with the
comment, “a current of such ambivalence raced across Baghdad along with
jubilation and surprise.”
An analysis, on the front page of that day’s New York Times (Apple, 2003,
April 10), struck a decidedly negative tone about the fall of Baghdad. The event
was framed as “the highwater mark for a new American determination to use the
nation’s military to project its power around the world.” N ear the end of the

Chapter 14 – Embedded Versus Behind-the-Lines Reporting on the 2003 Iraq War

169

article, the reporter acknowledged that “some of the Iraqis in the streets were
jubilant,” but quickly tempered the bit of optimism with the comment that “many
Iraqis resent America’s Middle East policies as much as other M uslims do.”
D ISC U SSIO N
Stories about Operation Iraqi Freedom filed by journalists embedded with
combat units differed noticeably from the stories filed by journalists working
behind the lines, with regard to the framing of war news.
The embedded journalists often described the war in terms of the weakness
of Iraqi army resistance, the frequency with which regular Iraqi forces deserted
or surrendered, and the joy of Iraqi civilians at the demise of the Hussein regime.
Their stories described the confusion and uncertainty of firefights, the tedium and
fatigue inherent in warfare, the precise targeting of Allied ordinance, the pinpoint
destruction such weapons produce, and friendly interactions between Allied
soldiers and Iraqi civilians.
Stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists described the war in terms of the
potential of Iraqi forces to mount significant unconventional counterattacks, the
ferocity of the Iraqi irregular forces, the adequacy of Allied war planning, and the
vulnerability of the Allies’ long supply lines. These stories emphasized civilian
anger at collateral damage, interruptions to utility infrastructure, and mistrust of
American intentions. Journalists based in Baghdad usually included the statements
of the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahhaf. In the early
stages of the war Al-Sahhaf’s assertions about the war situation were repeated
with little or no comment by the reporter. Only when the combat reached Baghdad
itself did some journalists began to question the veracity of Al-Sahhaf’s
statements, particularly when Al-Sahhaf denied the presence of Allied forces
which were visible from the hotel in which the reporters were staying.
In part, these differences in framing between embedded journalists and their
behind-the-lines colleagues can reasonably be attributed to the activities and
conditions they could directly observe. Embedded journalists, traveling with
combat forces, directly experienced the tedium, intensity, danger, and uncertainty
of those situations; they observed first-hand the dominance of Allied tactics and
weaponry, and the elation of Iraqi civilians as the Hussein regime disintegrated.
Behind-the-lines journalists witnessed different aspects of the war. At a physical
distance from the actual fighting, their stories concerned the uncertainty and
unpredictability of the war’s course, the anarchy that sometimes developed when
the control mechanisms of the Hussein regime collapsed, the potential— but not
the actuality— for significant Iraqi military resistance and counterattacks, and the
belligerent rhetoric of the Iraqi Minister of Information.
It is not plausible to attribute the framing differences to military control over
the reporting of the embedded reporters. The Department of Defense directive
establishing embedding as policy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003) specifically
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ruled out any general review of the reporters’ copy (para. 3.R), put interviews
with troops on the record (paragraph 4.A), and narrowly specified what sorts of
information could not be reported because of security concerns (para. 4.G, ff.).
Although unit commanders did have the latitude to impose delays on the filing of
reports from the combat theater because of concerns for operational security
(para. 2.C.4), they were not allowed to exclude reporters from the scene of the
fighting (para. 3.G). The directive also stated that the purpose of the embedding
policy was to maximize reporters’ access to information (para. 2.A), and that
restrictions on the release of information in their possession had to be justified
(para. 3.R). In sum, any notion that the copy of embedded reporters was censored
by the military while that of behind-the-lines journalists was free from
interference— and that the framing differences are attributable to the greater
freedom of the behind-the-lines journalists— is not supported. It is also worth
noting that, in general, journalists themselves were satisfied that their access to the
combat theater was adequate (Cooper, 2003).
Although we cannot conclusively demonstrate this to be the case, we feel
that the best explanation for the stark differences in the framing of the war stories
is that behind-the lines reporters were heavily influenced by newsroom culture,
and in the case of the New York Times, the paper’s stated editorial opposition to
the war. In the final analysis, embedded reporters were relaying their eye-witness
accounts of events while behind-the-lines reporters could only relay second-hand
accounts filtered through their preconceived understandings of the war.
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